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I. INTRODUCTION 
For committees operating under majority rule and certain 
other reasonably well-defined conditions, the Majority Rul·e Equilibrium 
(MRE) is a very good predictor of the committee's choice (Berl et al., 
1976; Fiorina and Plott, 1978; Isaac and Plott, 1978). The dynamics of 
the committee decision process which underlie this outcome have never 
been adequately explained. This might not be so serious a problem if 
an accessible MRE tended to exist for most possible configurations of 
committee members' preferences. However, the MRE usually does not 
exist (Rubenstein, 1979) and, furthermore, generalizations of the MRE 
are the subject of considerable theoretical speculation. 
Some evidence suggests that regularities do exist in the 
pattern of committee choices when an MRE does not exist (Fiorina and 
Plott, 1978; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1978a, 1978b). Many scholars 
believe that the key to characterizing these regularities lies in 
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explicitly modeling the dynamics of committee c~oice. A natural and 
tractable approach which we shall call the "SimJ.ille Agenda Assumption" 
(SAA) is to assume that a committee will accept an amendment to the 
current motion on the floor only if a majority of members prefer the 
amendment to the current motion. A number of researchers have 
demonstrated the theoretically unsettling point that such a process 
could connect almost any two alternatives in a social choice space 
(Cohen, 1977; McKelvey, 1976). Following similar intuitive arguments 
Schofield (1978) characterizes points connected by a particular set 
of "paths." Kramer (1977) explored the dynamics of the case for 
which the move from a point is to the point whifh can receive the 
maximal number of votes. He demonstrates that these "maximally 
dominating'-' sequences always enter the minimax set. More recently, 
Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Packel (FFP) (1978) have investigated the 
Simple Agenda Assumption within a stochastic framework. They assume 
that a committee will move from y to x with some positive 
probability if a majority of members prefer y to x and that it 
will never more to y from x if a majority does not prefer y to x. 
They prove that a probability distribution over final outcomes 
generally exists and that it has all its mass on the MRE if it exists 
and dominates all other points. In summary, th~oretical results 
suggest that the Simple Agenda Assumption may provide a reasonable 
direction in which to investigate the dynamics of committee choice. 
An analogous dynamic theory to those above could be constructed 
by beginning with the motivating assumption beh,ind the bargaining 
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set (Isaac and Plott, 1978; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1978b) instead of 
the MRE, although to the best of our knowledge this has not yet been 
done. That is, we would assume that a committee will only accept 
an amendment over the motion on the floor if the amendment is an 
objection which has no counterobjection. We will call this the 
Bargaining Set Assumption (BSA). Following this idea one can then 
investigate the properties of the implied dynamic model to see if the 
resulting predictions are plausible. 
Matthews (1977 a, b) has suggested a third dynamic 
structure for the committee choice process by examining undominated 
directions of change. We will call this the Undominated Directions 
Assumption (UDA). 
The purpose of this paper is to report the results of an 
experiment designed to check the empirical reliability of these 
assumptions about dynamic behavior. Since the three competing 
hypotheses are closely related, often differing only "slightly" 
in axiomatic structures, we can also gain some insight into the 
usefulness of individual assumptions with an eye towards possibly 
constructing new composite models. We report not only the specific 
results regarding the hypotheses we are examining, but also other 
regularities which appear to lie in the data. We speculate on the 
nature of these regularities as a guide to future experimentation 
and theoretical results. 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Theoretical analysis begins with a finite number of committee 
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members and a set of possible outcomes, X, over whibh the committee 
must choose. Each committee member has a preferenc~ relation over the 
set of possible outcomes; for every two points x and y in X he either 
prefers x to y, prefers y to x, or is indifferent. We construct the 
dominance relation, D, over X by asking whether a majority of members 
prefer one point to another. Formally, 
xDy ~ more than n/2 members prefer x to y. 
The MRE is then the set of points that are undomina,ted. That is, x is 
in the MRE if there is no y in X such that yDx. 
The FFP theory views the committee as alw,ays being faced with 
a status quo outcome--the outcome which would be re.ceived if the 
committee currently dissolved. The committee votes on whether to 
change the status quo. This movement is modeled as a time stationary 
stochastic process with the following characterist:Lcs: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
The probability of leaving an MRE point is, 0. 
The probability of leaving a non-MRE point is 1. 
The probability of moving from x to y is 0 if y 
does not dominate x. 
FFP also suggest plausible ways to assign values tq these probabilities 
based on relative numbers of coalitions supporting various alternatives 
over the status quo. However, their major theorem~ are proven at a 
satisfying level of generality; the values of the probabilities are 
unspecified. For a wide class of committees the s~ochastic process 
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converges to an equilibrium probability distribution. When an MRE 
exists and dominates all other points, the equilibrium probability 
distribution places all its mass on the MRE. FFP interpret the 
equilibrium probability distribution as the probability distribution 
over the committee's final choice. Intuitively, the equilibrium 
probability distribution approximates the likelihood of points being 
the status quo at any particular time. Therefore if the committee 
is equally likely to quit at any time, the equilibrium probability 
distribution also approximates the likelihood of points being the 
final outcome. The approximation becomes more exact as the time 
horizon is lengthened. (This argument is formalized in their paper.) 
The important consequence of this approach is that the notion 
of a point being "in" or "out" of the equilibrium set is replaced by 
a more continuous notion of a point being more or less stable. We 
believe that this is an important insight which our experimental 
results in no way contradict. Rather, our results suggest that the 
extremely simple stochastic process described by rules (i), (ii), and 
(iii) is not adequate to predict committee behavior. If a stochastic 
process model is to be used, then the stochastic process must be more 
complex. Section VI speculates on ways to enrich the theory which 
are suggested by our observations. 
The bargaining set was originally suggested as a solution 
concept for games with transferable utility and side payments in 
characteristic function form. A number of possible adaptations to 
games without side payments are possible. See Isaac and Plott (1978) 
for a fuller discussion. We present here a particularly simple 
version but it will be easily seen in Section IV that our results 
are robust to any of the possible adaptations. A proposal, p, is an 
ordered pair (x,C) consisting of a point x in the state space and 
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a coalition C larger than n/2. An objection to p is another proposal, 
p' = (x' ,C'), such that every member of C' prefers x' to x. A 
counterobjection to p' is a third proposal, p" (x",C"), such that 
p" is an objection to p and every person in C' n C" prefers x" to x'. 
The bargaining set is then all proposals such that every objection 
bas a counterobjection. 
The natural implicit dynamic of such a theory 
that a committee will move from x to y only if y is an objection 
to x and there is no counterobjection to y. This is a simple 
dynamic extension of the Bargaining Set Assumption (BSA). Theoretical 
analysis of this assumption could presumably be carried out in a 
fashion similar to that done for the SAA. 
Matthews proposed his dynamic theory for the case where X is 
Rn. He bases his theory on two interrelated assumptions: 
(i) A committee is selecting a change of the status quo from 
a set of possible changes. (The null change is a possible 
change.) Any change which is selected must be undominated 
in the set of possible changes. If a change is made, then 
there does not exist an alternative change from the set 
of possible changes which is preferred by a majority to 
the change chosen. 
(ii) In any time period, only alternatives a "small" distance 
from the previous outcome are presumed to be feasible. 
Taken to its logical and mathematically tractable extreme, 
this assumption converts the problem into one involving 
a continuum of social decisions, each of which determines 
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a direction in which to marginally shift the current statuss 
quo. In the discrete space in which we will be working, no 
natural definition of closeness exists. Therefore it seems 
most natural to replace Matthews' assumption (ii) by (ii)'. 
(ii)' In any time period any alternative (including the status quo) 
is a feasible choice. 
Therefore, our UDA is somewhat different from the Matthews' 
model. However, it seems to be the natural extension of his reasoning 
to a discrete case where no natural definition of closeness exists. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES: SETTING AND DESIGN 
The general experimental procedures' setting and design 
were faithful to those in general use by Fiorina and Plott (1978). 
The same design was run seven times. The committees were six person 
and made decisions by strict majority rule (more than half of those 
voting). Subjects were students from Pasadena City College recruited 
from the classes of cooperating instructors. Each subject was 
permitted to participate in only one experimental setting. Subjects 
only knew that they were going to participate in a "committee decision 
experiment" before reading the instructions. 
I 
I 
The substance of the decision was simplJ. 
. ' 
Each committee 
was asked to select a single letter from the set oif letters 
{A,B,C,D,E,F,G}. Each subject was assigned a payo1ff table over the 
seven letters. The table indicated the amount of money that he or 
she would receive from the experimenter expressed as a function of 
the committee's choice. These functions are on Table 1. If, for 
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example, the committee choice was A, then individu,als 1 and 2 received 
$30.25, individual 3 received $25.00, etc. 
The committees made their decisions under a simple set of 
parliamentary procedures. Each committee began deliberations with 
an option designated by the experimenter as the "initial motion on 
the floor." The letter so designated differed across experiments 
as discussed below. Subjects could propose amend~ents to the motion 
on the floor. Possibly after discussion, the amendment was voted on. 
I 
If it passed, it became the new motion on the floor. If it failed, 
the motion on the floor was unchanged. In either case, new amendments 
were now in order. If no amendment was on the flqor, subjects could 
vote on the motion on the floor. If it passed, tqe experiment ended 
and the motion on the floor was the committee's choice. If it failed, 
the experiment continued with the same motion on ~he floor. 
Subjects were not allowed to reveal the monetary value of 
their payoffs or to make agreements to split up payoffs afterwards. 
Besides this, subjects were free to discuss anythipg they wished. 
Of particular importance was the letter designated as the 
"initial motion on the floor." Choice of this pa,ameter was a key 
~ y 
34.75 
30.25 
25.00 
19.00 
14.75 
10.50 
5.00 
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TABLE 1 
--
1 2 3 4 5 6 
G B c D E F 
A A B G D E 
F G A c c D 
E F F B B c 
D E E A A G 
c D G F F B 
B c D E G A 
- -
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to differentiating among competing theories. 
i 
For ~xperiments 1 to 4, 
letter D was the initial motion on the floor. For;experiments 5 to 7, 
letter G was so designated. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THEORY 
Beside the fact that they were well tested and "debugged" 
the Fiorina-Plott rules were used because the FFP theory was presumably 
meant to apply to this case, if no others. Following this logic, the 
actual selection of the outcome space and preferen~es of committee 
members was essentially drawn from their paper. E~ample 5 in their 
paper is a four-person committee in a five-letter space exhibiting 
an "inaccessible" MRE in the sense that the MRE do111inates nothing. 
The dominance relation cycles over the remaining outcomes. We 
constructed a six-person committee in a seven-lett~r space with the 
same characteristics, taking care that the MRE poift, G, was not an 
obvious "fair point" so as to gain an experimental separation of the 
concepts of MRE and fairness. 
The majority rule dominance relation for the committee is 
best conceptualized as three parts over the set of all letters. The 
first part is point G alone. Point G is the MRE. It is dominated 
by nothing and dominates nothing. The other two p~rts involve the 
remaining letters {A,B,C,D,E,F}. First, notice as, shown on Figure 1 
that each letter is preferred to the one immediate~y "before" it by 
a 5 to 1 vote (view A as occurring "after" F). Second, as shown on 
Figure 2, each letter is preferred to the letter t~o places "before" it 
by a 4 to 2 vote. 
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Regarding the bargaining set, it is easy to see that G is 
the sole point in the bargaining set; there are no objections against 
G, so it is true that for every objection (that exists) to G there 
is a counterobjection. Thus G is in the bargaining set. Now let 
x be any one of the other six letters. Let y be immediately "after" 
(once again, view A as occurring "after" F) x and let z be immediately 
after y. The letters y and z provide the only objections to x. An 
objection using y can be counterobjected to by a proposal using z. 
However, no counterobjection exists to an objection using z. For 
' example B and C are both objections to A but C is a counterobjection 
to B and there is no counterobjection to C. Since z is an objection 
to x for which no counterobjection exists, x cannot be an element of 
the bargaining set. It follows immediately that G is the unique 
element of the bargaining set. This result is robust against variations 
of definitions of objections and counterobjections found in Isaac and 
Plott (1978). 1 
The Matthews' model can be applied as follows. Suppose 
the status quo is x. , A change from x to y is dominated by a change 
from x to z if and only if a majority of the individuals prefer z to 
y. The Matthews' path from a point is in the direction which is 
undominated by any other direction. An examination of the preferences 
above will show that from any status quo x, the move from x to G is 
the unique undominated direction. Thus, the unique Matthews' path 
from any point (including G) is directly to G. 
Before reviewing the results, it is useful to indicate 
what predictions the SAA, BSA and UDA would make about the choice of 
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any committee with the preferences above. Predictions in the first 
set (1-SAA, 1-BSA, and 1-UDA) deal in general with the path taken by 
amendments. The second and third set of predictions deal with the 
FIGURE 1 final choice of the committee. 
Prediction 1-SAA: Any amendment adopted by the committee will be to 
A 
J_ 
'1- a letter immediately "after" the motion on the floor or two places 
F B 
y G A "after" the motion on the floor. For example, if the motion on the 
,E c floor were A, the committee might move to B or C but never to D, E, 
.>.. 7 
D F, or G. 
Prediction 1-BSA: Any amendment adopted by the committee will be 
to a letter two places "after" the motion on the floor. For example, 
if the motion on the floor were A, the committee might move to C but 
FIGURE 2 
nowhere else. 
Prediction 1-UDA: The committee will adopt the amendment G over any 
FOA B 
"'. G 
E C 
D 
status quo other than G and stay at G if the status quo is G. 
Prediction 2-SAA and 2-BSA: If the committee begins at a point 
other than G, G will not be the final choice. 
Prediction 2-UDA: If the committee begins at a choice other than G, 
G will be the final choice. 
Prediction 3: If the committee begins at G, G will be the final choice 
(all three assumptions lead to this prediction). 
Note that Predictions 2-SAA and 2-BSA contradict the standard 
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static theories of the MRE and bargaining set which predict that G Prediction 1-SAA: Results 
will be chosen. On the other hand, Prediction 2-UDA is consistent The above summary of the results as well as the fuller rfport 
with the static theories. The static theories are in agreement with of results in Appendix II suggests that much behavior occurs which is 
all of the dynamic theories on Prediction 3. contrary to this prediction. Consistent with the prediction, no 
committee refused to adopt an amendment which dominated the status 
V. RESULTS quo. However, eight of the thirteen amendments which were adopted 
Seven committee experiments were run. I~ the first four, did not dominate the status quo, in violation of this prediction. 
initial motion on the floor was D. In the last three it was G. The Two of these eight moves were actually in a direction opposite the 
results are fully reported in Appendix II. A record of the accepted dominance relation. Therefore, 62 percent of the actual moves and 
amendments for the experiMents is as follovrs (x -+ y menns a motion was 29 percent of the suggested moves occurred in violation of this 
accepted by a majority to move the motion on the floor from attention prediction. As well, 24 percent of individual members' votes on 
x to attention y: amendments violated their own individual preference relations. 
Experiment 1: D-+E-+B Prediction 1-BSA: Results 
Initial ~ Experiment 2: D 
Motion 
D Experiment 3: D -+ F -+ A -+ B,-+ F 
This prediction fared even worse than 1-MRA. Only one of 
the thirteen moves was in accord with the prediction. Note that of 
Experiment 4: D-+A-+B the five moves which did follow the dominance relation, four were to 
' 
the point immediately after. Only one was to the point two places 
fxp"liDen' '' G-+F Initial 
MotGion Experiment 6: G-+A-+F 
Experiment 7: G-+A-+G 
after. The point one place after won by a 5 to 1 majority, the point 
two places after won by a 4 to 2 majority. This result therefore 
suggests that the size of majority supporting a move may be a more 
important determinant of committee choice than the existence or non-
We now have enough information to determine how the 
existence of a counterobjection. It is thus somewhat supportive of 
predictions fared. Kramer's (1975) use of the "maximally dominating" sequence. 
Prediction 1-UDA: Results 
This prediction fared worst of all. Tooimany amendments 
other than G were adopted for it to be plausible. A committee may 
well select y over x even ifl: some third point z dominates y. One 
might still hope that Matthews' theory performs be~ter when the 
outcome space is Rn and some notion of closeness e~ists. However, 
a theory whose qualitative results hinge crucially: on assuming the 
existence of a continuum as opposed to a discrete space (rather than 
merely employing it as a technical convenience) rna~ be suspect for 
this reason alone. 
Prediction 2: Results 
Since the two variants of prediction 2 contradict one 
another, only one can be true, and it is easiest tp deal with them 
together. Predictions 2-SAA and 2-BSA were verifi,ed; Prediction 
2-UDA was contradicted. In all four cases where the committee began 
at D, G was not the final choice. Our results alsp demonstrate that 
the static models of the MRE and bargaining set are not generally 
accurate when the equilibrium does not dominate other points. The 
general notion of requiring dominance of x over y for motion from 
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y to x (rather than x merely not being dominated by y) seems to be 
useful for predictive purposes. An MRE may be quite stable if reached, 
but if it does not dominate other points, it may ~ever be reached. 
In accord with this insight, we might hope to improve the UDA's 
predictive value by requiring that any selected cbange dominate 
all possible changes instead of merely be undominfted by them. 
However, no such change ever exists for our committee, so this 
alternative theory is not applicable to our committee. (For some 
committees, .even an undominated direction does not always exist.) 
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The general non-existence of a dominating direction is a large problem 
with the Matthew's theory if the notion that "motion requires 
dominance" is correct. 
Prediction 3: Results 
This prediction was wrong two of three times. In two 
of the three cases where the committee began at G, it finally 
selected a different point. Since prediction 3 is also a prediction 
of the static MRE and bargaining set theories, our results also 
contradict them. 
Our results demonstrate that the SAA, BSA and UDA cannot be 
used exclusively as a general model for predicting committee choice. 
The BSA and UDA are particularly suspect. In the next section we 
speculate on reasons for its fialure and identify implied modifications 
to the theory. 
VI. FURTHER SPECULATIONS 
Although our experiment was only designed to yield "hard" 
evidence regarding the SAA, BSA and UDA, we could not help but notice 
certain regularities in the committee's choice procedure. In this 
section we speculate on the nature of these regularities as a guide 
to future experimentation and research. 
In particular, much of the seemingly anomalous behavior of 
committee members is consistent with the theory that committee members 
possess subjective probability distributions over 
I 
~he final outcome 
! 
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conditional on their own vote. Members may then p~rceive opportunities 
for strategic action and act accordingly. 
observed. 
Two similar types of behavior on amendme~t votes were 
l 
(i) Members who ranked the current motion on the floor 
very highly often were willing to accept, amendments 
they ranked lower. Over twenty examples of such behavior 
can be identified by referring to Appendfx II. 
(ii) Members who ranked the current motion on the floor very 
low often voted against amendments offer~ng a small 
improvement. Six examples of this behav~or can be 
identified by referring to Appendix II. 
Case (i) is consistent with the idea tha~ subjects perceived 
a reasonable hope of the lower ranked alternative being the final outcome 
if they supported it, but saw very little hope for having the current 
motion on the floor accepted even if they supporteq it. That is, the 
I 
expected payoff from supporting the lower ranked a~ternative may have 
appeared to be larger. As an example of the type of rationale we have 
in mind, consider the eighth vote of experiment s~ or the fourth vote 
of experiment seven. In both cases member number one voted for the 
amendment A over the status quo G even though A wa~ worth less to him. 
(See the payoff tables in Section III.) Suppose t~at member one 
suspected that if he voted for A, it would be acce11ted by the committee. 
However, if he voted against A, he suspected G wouLd be the final choice 
! 
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with probability 1/2 and all other outcomes would be equally likely. 
He was therefore faced with evaluating two gambles. 
Gamble 1: A with probability 1 
Gamble 2: G with probability 1/2 
other letters with probability 1/12 
The expected value of gamble 1 is of course $30.25. The expected 
value of gamble 2 is $26.08. Therefore an expected value maximizer 
with these subjective probabilities conditional on his vote would 
vote for A. 
Furthermore, even if the expected payoff from supporting 
the lower ranked alternative was smaller, a risk averse member 
might have opted for it because it was more certain (i.e., its 
expected utility was higher even though its expected value was 
lower). Behavior of type (i) suggests that the committee decision 
process is likely to be more "sticky" than sometimes thought. If 
support appeared to be gathering for the current motion on the floor, 
a risk averse expected utility maximizer would place value on the 
certainty associated simply with accepting it. Once support has 
begun to coalesce for a point, there may be a natural tendency for 
the process to accelerate. 
Type (ii) behavior is consistent with the same type of 
argument as with type (i). Suppose a member believed that if he 
supported the higher ranked alternative, it would be quite likely 
to become the committee's final choice. However, if he did not support 
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it, a third point better than either would be more likely to be 
chosen. 
We do not find the expected utility theory convincing sole:j_y 
because it is consistent with the data. Subjects themselves offered 
crude versions of the theory to explain their behavior in postexperiment 
discussions. 
Another regularity in behavior which we observed was that 
members were more likely to suggest and support a motion to accept the 
current motion on the floor when they ranked it above average. In 
particular, members were repeatedly observed supporting a status quo 
which gave them a medium payoff. When questioned, they explained that 
they preferred the n1edium payoff now to taking their chances on further 
amendments. Crude versions of the expected utility theory were used 
by the subjects to explain their behavior. The import of this point 
is more than that it is another piece of evidence fo;r the expected 
utility or strategic approach to the dynamics of committee decision-
making; it also means that the committee will exhibit differential 
propensities to stop at various status quos. A poi~t at which a 
majority receive fairly high payoffs may be a very likely candidate 
for an equilibrium even if it is dominated by another point. The FFP 
assumption that the process is equally likely to stqp at every stage 
I 
is inconsistent with this line of theoretical development and is thus 
an aspect of their model which should receive attention. 
One final observed regularity was that in the "first move" 
of the experiment,, participants were particularly pr;one to vote contrary 
to their simple preferences. While 16 percent of all votes cast were 
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contrary to the voters' preferences, this was true for 28 percent of 
the votes cast on the first amendment accepted. We first noticed this 
phenomenon after running experiments one through four where participants 
began at point D. However, evidence from the first four experiments 
was really only derived from listening to the conversations. Notions 
such as fairness or establishing a "fairly good" payoff level for 
everyone were brought up by subjects with much more frequency in 
discussions preceding the first move than after it. Subjects seemed 
more willing to compromise at the first stage. 
This encouraged us to run three more experiments beginning 
at the MRE, G. If there is a tendency for the first move of a 
committee experiment to be particularly independent of the dominance 
relation, we might in fact observe the committee moving away from the 
MRE if it starts there. This in fact occurred in all three experiments. 
Furthermore, in all three cases the committee's initial move was to a 
more palatable status quo in the sense defined above; almost everyone 
did "fairly well." In the case ofF, no one received his minimum payoff. 
In the case of A, although one person did receive his lowest payoff, 
everyone else was near the middle. During the experiment, points 
F and A were repeatedly suggested as "fair" points and no other points 
were. 
A number of possible reasons for this observed behavior exist. 
Possibly players simply have an initial reaction to be fair. Possibly 
they want to establish a fairly good payoff for themselves before 
worrying about anything else. Possibly they want to establish a rapport 
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and "working relationship" with the other committee members. Members 
suggested all three reasons for their behavior in p stexperiment 
discussi.ons. The fact remai.ns, however, that regardless of the reason, 
the fi.rst move of a committee seems to be less related to the dominance 
relation than subsequent moves. 
Inci.dentally, this result suggests a parti.cularly interesting 
method for mani.pulati.ng a committee, analogous to the agenda control 
methods suggested by other papers (Cohen, Levine, P}ott 1978; Levine and 
Plott 1977; Plott and Levine 1978). An obvi.ous "fair point" should be 
inserted into the outcome space so that the poi.nt the manipulator 
desires to be chosen dominates the fair point. Hopefully, the committee's 
ini.tial move to a "palatable" status quo would move it to the fair 
point. The experiments reported here suggest that after this initial 
move the dominance relation will become more relevant; therefore, the 
I 
point desired by the mani.pulator may be the next poi.nt chosen. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Our data suggest that the SAA, BSA, or UD~ assumptions when taken 
alone are not generally characteristic of dynamic committee behavior. 
Members perceive opportunities for strategic action and act accordi.ngly. 
Rational behavior frequently involves voting for po,ints individuals 
I 
prefer less than some moti.on "on the floor" or agai~st points they 
prefer more. Our committe.es were small (si.x indivi.duals) so the 
possibility remains that the assumptions become mor
1
e characteristic 
of committee dynamics as the committee size grows. 
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Our data also suggest that the first move of a committee 
may be qualitatively different from subsequent moves. More 
experimentation is needed to identify precisely why this may be the 
case. 
Finally our data suggest that to the extent the dominance 
relation does apply, the relative size of winning coalitions supporting 
various amendments may be more important in determining committee 
choice than the existence or nonexistence of counterobjections. 
APPENDIX I 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
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1. We would like to have you participate in a committee process 
experiment. The purpose of the experiment is to help us under-
stand certain technical aspects of the generally complex ways 
in which committees operate. The instructions are simple. 
If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might 
earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash. 
Support for this research was supplied by the National Science 
Foundation. 
2. All you have to do is to attend a committee meeting and for this 
participation you will be paid. The purpose of the meeting is 
to choose a letter from the set of letters [A,B,C,D,E,F,G]. Only 
one of the seven letters will be chosen by the committee and the 
payment you receive for participation depends entirely upon which 
one it is. For example, on the enclosed compensation table, the 
amount listed beside the letter A is the amount ~ou will receive 
if it is chosen by the committee; the amount beside B is the 
payment you will receive if it is the choice, etc. The compen-
sation tables may differ among individuals. This means that the 
patterns of preferences differ and the monetary qmounts may not 
be comparable. The option which would result in the highest 
payoff to you may not result in the highest payoff to someone 
else. You should decide what choice you want the committee to make 
and do whatever you wish within the confines of the rules to get 
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things to go your way. The experimenters, however, are not 
primarily concerned with whether or how you participate so long 
as you stay within the confines of the rules. (Under no circum-
stances may you mention anything quantitative about your compen-
sation. You are free, if you wish, to indicate which ones you 
like best, etc., but you cannot mention anything about the actual 
monetary amounts. Under no circumstances may you mention anything 
about activities which might involve you and other committee 
members after the experiment, i.e. no deals to split up afterward 
and no physical threats.) 
3. Procedures. All votes will be decided by a strict majority of 
those voting. 
The process begins with an existing motion _____ on the floor. 
You are free to propose amendments to this motion. Suppose, for 
example, X is the motion on the floor and you want the group to 
consider the letter Y. Simply raise you hand and when you are 
recognized by the chair, say "I move to amend the motion toY." 
The group will then proceed to discuss the amendment. After 
discussion, a vote on the amendment takes place. If the amendment 
passes, the letter proposed in the amendment is the new motion on 
the floor. If the amendment fails, the old motion is once again 
on the floor. In either case, new amendments may now be submitted. 
As you can see, amendments simply change the motion on the floor. 
You may pass as many amendments as you wish. 
When no amendment is currently under consideration by the 
committee, a vote on the motion on the floor may take place. 
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If the motion passes, it becomes the committee's decision and you 
each receive the amount on your compensation sheets associated 
with the chosen letter. If the motion fails, it remains as the 
motion on the floor and is subject to further amendments or votes. TEST 
Discussions on an amendment (or the motion o,n the floor) 
are terminated by a motion to end debate. If there are no 1. At I would make the most possible money. The amount I 
objections to the motion to end debate, an immediate vote on the would receive is 
amendment (or motion) will take place. If there a,re objections, 
the motion to end debate will itself be put to a vote. If the 2. At I would make the least possible money. The amount I 
motion to end debate fails, the discussion continues. If it would receive is 
passes, a vote on the amendment (or motion) immediately takes place. 
To sum up, the existing motion on the floor is You 3. Suppose B is the motion on the floor and an amendment to move 
are free to funend this motion as you wish. The meeting will not to point D passes (fails)? Then the new motion on the floor is 
end until a strlct majority of those voting consent to end debate , ___ ). 
and accept some motion. Your compensation will be, determined by 
the motion on the floor finally adopted by the majority. 4. Suppose an amendment to move to A passes and no further amendments 
4. Are there any questions? 
pass. If the motion on the floor is then adopted by a majority, 
5. We would like you to answer the questions on the attached page. 
my compensation is 
These should help you understand the instructions. 
Experiment Number 1 
, Starting Letter D I 
--I 
Motion or Amendment 
Amend to E 1 2 
Amend to B 2 
Accept B 2 
APPENDIX II 
RESULTS 
In Favor 
] 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4®* 5 
5®* 
5 
Opposed Abstained 
6<D* 
1 6 
1 6 
*A circled supers9ript indicates that the member voted contrary to his preference relation. 
The number in the circlJe corresponds to the number of places at which the chosen point was ranked 
I 
below the other point. 
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Experiment Number 2 
Starting Letter D 
--,-
Motion or Amendment In Favor Opposed Abstained 
Accept D 1 2 4 5 6 3 
Experiment Number 3 
Starting Letter D 
Motion or Amendment In Favor Opposed Abstained 
Amend to B 2 3 1 4 5 6 
Amend to F 1 2 3 4®* 50* 6 
Amend to A 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Amend to B 2 3 4 5 6 1 
Amend to F 1 2®*3®*6 I 4 5 
Accept F 1 2 3 4 5 6 
*A circled superscript indicates that the member voted contrary to his preference relation. 
The number in the circle corresponds to the number of places at which the chosen point was ranked 
below the other point. 
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Experiment Number _4_1_ 
I Starting Letter Di 
--1 
! I Motion or Amendment In Favor Opposed Abstained 
I 
I iD* {D* 5 Amend to G 1 •2 6 
Amend to A 
I 
1 2 3 4rsl 5 6 
Amend to B 2 3 4 5 6 1 
Accept B I 2 3 4 5 1 6 
*A circled super~cript indicates that the member voted contrary to his preference relation. 
I 
The number in the cir6le corresponds to the number of places at which the chosen point was ranked 
below the other point, 
i 
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Experiment Number 5 
Starting Letter G 
Motion or Amendment In Favor Opposed Abstained 
Amend to E 5 1 2 l:D* 4 iD* 
Amend to F {!J* zCSY' 3 iSJ' 5 6 
Accept F 1 3 4 5 6 2 
*A circled superscript indicates that the member voted contrary to his preference relation. 
I 
The number in the circle corresponds to the number of places at which the chosen point was ranked 
below the other point. 
Experiment Number _6_. 
! 
, Starting Letter G 
--! 
i 
I I 
I Motion or Amendment! In Favor Opposed Abstained 
! 
3(])* 4 60' Amend to E 5 1 2 
Amend to F I 3 6 1 2 4 50* 
Amend to D I 4 5 6 1 2 3 
Amend to A 
I 
l<D* 2 3 4 5®* 6 
Amend to B 1 li>*i!i!' 4 5(!)* 6 
Amend to F I 2@*3 6 1 4 5<D* 
Amend to D 
I 
4 5 6 1 2 3 
Amend to A l(J)* 2 3 4CJJ' 5®*6 
Amend to E 5 1 2 3 4 6®* 
Amend to F {»* £%J* 30\0\0* 6 
Accept F 1 2 3 4 5 6 
*A circled super~cript indicates that the member voted contrary to his preference relation. 
I 
The number in the cir~le corresponds to the number of places at which the chosen point was ranked 
I 
below the other point 1 
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Experiment Number ___ 7
Starting Letter G 
Motion or Amendment In Favor Opposed Abstained 
Amend to B 2 3 1 4 s®*6 
Amend to D 4 5 6 1 2 3 
Amend to E 5 6 1 2 fJY4 
Amend to A l<D* 2 3 5 I 4 6 
Amend to F l<D* 3<D* 6 I 2 4 5 
Amend to G 1 2<D*lJf' 4 6 
I 
5 
Accept G 1 2 3 4 6 5 
*A circled superscript indicates that the member voted contrary to his preference relation. 
The number in the circle corresponds to the number of places at which the chosen point was ranked 
below the other point. 
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1. 
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FOOTNOTE 
I 
To see this, consider without loss of generalitif the letter A. 
! 
The letter used in an objection to A must dominrte A; therefore 
objection us
1
es B, C dominates 
A and B so can always provide a counterobjectiop. If C is an 
it must use either B or C. If the 
objection, the only proposals which can be coun
1
terobjections must 
use B since the letter of the counterobjection must dominate A. 
However, C dominates B by a 5 to 1 majority. Tpe intersection 
of people in the objection and counterobjectionl coalitions must 
contain at least two people. Therefore at leas~ one person in 
the intersection must prefer C to B. Therefore
1
B cannot be a 
counterobjection. 
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